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The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or simply Corporate Responsibility (CR)​[1]​ originated from the United States of America.​[2]​ Although some posit that it was in 1953 that the expression ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ was actually first introduced in corporate America by Howard R. Bowen in his book, Social Responsibilities of the Business,​[3]​ others​[4]​ contend that CSR actually dates back to the philanthropic work of wealthy business owners such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, who gave away millions of dollars for social uses and causes.​[5]​ Yet, others maintain that CSR should be traced to US 19th century boycotts of food stuffs produced with slave labour.​[6]​  On the other hand, in the United Kingdom (UK), the concept of CSR was virtually non-existent before 1970.​[7]​ As a matter of fact, it was not until 1973 that the most influential business community pressure group in the UK – the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) - accorded some recognition and made a statement on CSR.​[8]​ 
It is crucial to state that although CSR may entail some form of local community development and corporate philanthropy but is not all about these philanthropic gestures; it might have evolved from charity but has obviously metamorphosed into modern conceptions such as: the triple bottom line (TBL) of planet, people and profit;​[9]​ the green movement;​[10]​ (including green advertising, green product manufacture and competition and green management); the advocacy for sustainable development in business and society​[11]​  amongst others.  CSR is now said to mean the exercise of social responsibility in how corporate profits are made.​[12]​ Further, it is now a comprehensive business philosophy which appreciates the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time.​[13]​ It is the obligations (social or legal) which concern the major actual and possible social impact of the activities of the corporation in question, whether or not these activities are intended or do in fact promote the profitability of the particular corporation.​[14]​ CSR is a comprehensive business philosophy that businesses must embrace a wider and broader level of accountability and responsibility to meet the expectations of groups (usually called stakeholders) other than shareholders. Therefore, CSR is much broader in scope than just corporate culture or some simple call for business ethics which is concerned with moral dilemmas such as bribery and corruption.​[15]​






2.	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CSR REGULATION 
Regulation is an intentional activity of attempting to control, order, or influence the behaviour of others.​[16]​ There are many reasons for introducing regulations: sometimes, they are to cure problems associated with natural monopolies, or to ensure proper allocation of scare resources, or for public safety and welfare et cetera.​[17]​ Regulation can include law but it is not limited to law as the concept of regulation is broader than law itself. Law can be an instrument of regulation which is the target of this article to use the instrumentality of law, amongst others, to provide a regulatory and enforcement system.   When juxtaposed to governance, while governance concerns how and why an entity or system structures and conducts its affairs, regulation concerns how and why behaviour relating to the conduct of affairs of an entity is directed, steered and otherwise guided.​[18]​ On the other hand, enforcement is a means to end and not an end in and of itself.​[19]​ The goal of enforcement is compliance with regulations and the achievement of the underlying goals of regulations.​[20]​ Generally, in order to understand the rationale behind specific regulatory initiatives of corporate law as envisaged in this article, it may also be important to appreciate the regulatory consequences of different corporate law theories. Such discussions are outside the purview of this article and are thus excluded.​[21]​
Further, it is also important to highlight the characteristic features and the various methods, forms and types which regulations have taken over the years.  Generally, the vagaries​[22]​ of these regulations over time have been informed by the different theoretical stance of regulators. The following forms and methods of regulations have been identified​[23]​:
1.	Soft Law versus Hard Law Regulations;
2.	Principle-Based versus Rule-Based Regulations;
3.	Voluntary versus Mandatory Regulations.


Soft Law versus Hard Law Regulation
Soft law regulation can be described as non-legally binding regulations usually containing the aspirational goals, lofty ideals and other best practices expected to govern or regulate certain behaviours. The importance of soft law non-legally binding regulations is underscored at international law given its state-centeredness.​[24]​ In other words, since International Law is usually seen in terms of law of nations and its rules and regulations applicable only to state actors, (as opposed to private individuals, companies inclusive) regulations to order corporate behaviour at international level usually takes the shape of soft laws. These soft law instruments are those that do not have the status of international treaties which are ratified by states and they include guidelines, declarations, recommendations and resolutions.​[25]​ Although soft law regulations are non-binding, they are not entirely useless. Sometimes they ‘provide official credibility and impetus for the development of complementary multi-stakeholder CSR initiatives at industry, regional or wider levels …’​[26]​, or help to galvanise ‘support for a particular programme or policy [and] can help to focus thinking about certain issues to clarify positions and to develop understanding between states’​[27]​ or sometimes may ‘harden into positive law, where it is seen as evidence of emergent new standards of international law’.​[28]​ Soft laws also provide a quick and flexible response to contemporary challenges and allow non-state actors to participate in international law where they cannot in traditional international law making processes.​[29]​
Hard Law regulations are the exact opposite of Soft Laws. Hard Law regulation is a positive, legally binding regulation with clear and predictable enforcement mechanism usually in domestic legislations. Very few CSR regulatory systems have adopted hard law approach.  The provisions of section 135 of the 2013 Indian Companies Act 2013 requiring, inter alia, the constitution of a CSR Committee in the board of directors of qualified Indian companies is a clear example of CSR hard law regulation. In 2002, in the UK, effort was made to harden CSR regulation​[30]​ by the introduction of a Private Member sponsored bill on the subject of CSR, but it never saw the light of day. Similarly, in March 2007 in Nigeria, a bill was presented before the highest legislative house in Nigeria, the Senate, but it also did not pass the second reading.​[31]​   

Principle-Based versus Rule-Based Regulations
Principle-based regulations are the regulatory modes, as the name suggests, that contain usually non-prescriptive guidelines and principles such as the OECD Guidelines for MNE, UNGC et cetera. The Rule-Based Regulations are the prescriptive regulatory modes containing clearly defined enforcement mechanisms and predictable remedies for victims in cases of violations. Domestic legislations with positive rules and regulations include the US 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act, UK 2006 Companies Act, Indian 2013 Companies Act and the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap C20 Laws of Federation of Nigeria 2004. It should be noted that while principle-based regulations may be common at international regulatory dialogues for reasons earlier explained, there is nothing intrinsically connecting principle-based regime and international regulations together. Some provisions in the codes of corporate governance in Nigeria are principle-based such as the Nigerian Communication Commission Code of Corporate Governance for the Telecommunications Industry, 2014.​[32]​  
Invariably on the other hand, Rule-Based Regulations contain positive rules and regulations are backed by predictable enforcement mechanisms. Rule-based regulations are said to provide guidance for desired conduct in a clearer way than principle-based regulation.​[33]​ One major reason for less adoption of and the antagonistic attitude of the business community to rule-based regulatory regime such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US is accusation that they are over-regulative, too prescriptive, intrusive and sometimes a disrespect of the other regulatory initiatives of other countries.​[34]​

Voluntary versus Mandatory Regulations;
Voluntary regulations are optional in terms of compliance. Under CSR discussions, voluntariness appears to have been informed by two phenomena: First, the false notion that CSR is synonymous with corporate charity and secondly, the business case argument in CSR parlance. The idea that CSR is corporate gift, or donation or representing something beyond the requirements of the law has been shown above​[35]​ to be faulty.  This faulty notion constitutes a major factor behind the popular belief that CSR or its regulation must be on a voluntary basis. This is, without question, the stance of the EU​[36]​ on CSR and its regulatory or enforcement regimes.
Further, the business case argument of CSR appears to be the official CSR policy stance amongst many EU member states.  It is argued that CSR is a voluntary concept and must be strategically shown to have some positive values, benefits and other company (shareholder)-success-related attributes before it may be embraced by the business community.​[37]​ As a corollary of the former statement, it is also argued that the normal interplay of free market forces is the best method to regulate CSR and therefore, there is no need for any hard law external and mandatory CSR rules.​[38]​ Arguably, this is the most significant disservice to the CSR conception. This is partly because, it appears to represent the official position of the EU (the largest economy in the world and the host community of the majority of the largest multinational enterprises in the world) and has provided the nest for the nefarious activities of many a rogue​[39]​ company who will only fly below the radar of self-regulation. This regime will only likely breed mere brush-stroking and surface scratching regulatory initiatives and at best, good enough only for Thomas McInerney’s Group A or B businesses as analysed below: 
Many regulatory scholars recognize that there are four types of companies with which regulators have to deal. These four types include: those who know the law and are willing to follow it (Group A); those who do not know the law but would like to be law abiding (Group B); those who know the law and do not want to follow it (Group C); and those who do not know the law and do not wish to be law abiding (Group D). Most CSR literature does not even reflect these basics. As this analysis suggests, Group A firms are willing to comply on intrinsic grounds.​[40]​

From the above, the relevant question is, how effective and efficient are the voluntary initiatives against Groups C and D businesses? In truth, however convincing the business case, together with the voluntary CSR approach and free market forces argument may be, the voluntary regulatory initiatives will never be strong enough to secure responsible corporate behaviour.​[41]​ Mandatory Regulatory initiatives are the exact opposite of the voluntary self-regulatory principles. They are not optional and must be complied with.
In spite of the above discussions in respect of the headings in which regulations may appear, it is important to note that the usefulness of identifying the methods in modern discussions on regulating CSR is also gradually whittling down and the lines between the hitherto strictly voluntary and mandatory spheres are getting blurred.​[42]​ Further, Jennifer Zerk is quoted explaining that: ‘in short, the “voluntary versus mandatory” debate is based on the mistaken impression that CSR and the law are somehow separate, whereas in reality they are intertwined’ which means that the crucial question is not whether CSR should be “voluntary” or “mandatory” but in light of a particular problem, what is the best regulatory response?’​[43]​ 

3.	REGULATING AND ENFORCING CSR IN CORPORATE NIGERIA – GENERAL OVERVIEW
This section of the article discusses CSR regulatory and enforcement attempts in corporate Nigeria. It examines the CSR mechanisms contained in hard law instruments​[44]​ and soft law regulatory instruments of government agencies by way of codes of conducts.​[45]​

3.1	Corporate Social Responsibility Bill 2007
With a view to providing a comprehensive and adequate relief to host communities suffering the negative consequences of the industrial and commercial activities of companies operating in their areas​[46]​, a Corporate Social Responsibility Bill was introduced to the Nigerian National Assembly in 2007.​[47]​ The Bill sought to be the direct primary legislation on all CSR activities in corporate Nigeria and it established a CSR Commission to collect a compulsory 3.5% CSR spent from corporations for the purpose of executing community development projects for the citizenry.​[48]​ 
The bill received very strong criticisms for its attempt to introduce another form of corporate tax and its poor atavistic conception of CSR as just some corporate gift or charity​[49]​ and therefore never became law but only useful at the archives of the National Assembly bills. 
It is instructive to note that in 2002, a similar Corporate Responsibility Bill was introduced into the English Parliament which also sought to create a government agency which will be directly and primarily responsible for coordination, regulations and enforcement of CSR activities within the UK business community. ​[50]​  Although the 2002 UK CSR Bill may be said to be similar with the Nigeria 2007 CSR Bill in the sense that both sought to directly legislate on CSR by means of hard law approach, the UK attempt can be differentiated however. The UK bill never in any of its provisions tries to reduce the CSR or corporate accountability or transparency to some corporate tax, levy or contribution. It sought amongst others to make provision for certain companies to produce and publish reports on environmental, social and economic and financial matters; to require those companies to consult on certain proposed operations; to specify certain duties and liabilities of directors; to establish and provide for the functions of the Corporate Responsibility Board; and to provide for remedies for aggrieved persons. Very importantly, the current state of the UK CSR bill must be appreciated against the backdrop of UK’s membership of the EU. The UK system is perhaps better understood as an implementation​[51]​ of the EU 2003 Fourth Directive on annual accounts (popularly called the Accounts Modernisation Directive)​[52]​ which imposes obligations on companies to consider and report on non-financial (social and environmental) matters in their annual reports. The Accounts Modernisation Directive states that companies in member states shall report annually on ‘non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to environment and employee matters’ in relation to the worldwide operations of that company.​[53]​ Further, in 2014, the EU expanded and improved on its disclosure requirements by requesting disclosure of information on sustainability such as social and environmental factors, with a view to identifying sustainability risks and increasing investor and consumer trust through its Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22nd October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups.​[54]​  Legal transposition amongst member states in the EU is not expected until 2017 and the directive is clear in its adoption of the ‘comply or explain’ compliance mechanism.​[55]​  Therefore in the UK, CSR issues and disclosures on non-financial social and environmental matters are both a matter of requirements in its principal company legislation [sections 172, 417 and 423(5) in compliance with the EU directives] and demands of best financial reporting practices (further to the 2005 Accounting Standards Board’s designed Reporting Standard ASB RSI – Operating and Financial Review).
Secondly, the aborted Nigerian CSR Bill is also juxtaposed against CSR provisions in the 2013 Indian Companies Act. ​[56]​ It would appear that the Indian CSR regulatory regime also has some similarities with the aborted Nigerian counterpart. They both specify that a certain percentage of the corporate revenue be spent on CSR activities. However, there are a few differences: first, the Nigerian CSR Bill had sought to establish a CSR Commission to regulate CSR activities. The Indian regime however seeks some form of self-regulatory approach to CSR by creating a CSR Committee from the company’s Board of Directors. Secondly, the Indian regime creates a form of internalised self-regulatory regulator (in the CSR Committee of the Board of Directors), the Nigerian system rather chose an externalised regulator in the CSR Commission to monitor corporate accountability and responsibility from outside the business community.
In concluding on the first CSR regulatory attempt in corporate Nigeria, it is instructive to reiterate its fundamental flaw in assuming or reducing CSR to just some corporate tax and then, its proposal to establish the CSR Commission, an externalised CSR regulator with little knowledge of or access to the internal workings of individual companies and resultant regulatory inefficiency that will arise.​[57]​   

3.2	Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990
The Companies and Allied Matters Act​[58]​ (CAMA) is the primary corporate law legislation in Nigeria. The conception of CSR under CAMA has perhaps been the tremendous influence on the nature of CSR practices in corporate Nigeria. The earlier noted restrictive CSR conception amongst Nigerian corporate managers as just corporate gifting or philanthropy is directly attributable to CAMA provisions. As also noted earlier in this article, while CSR may sometime entail some elements of corporate charity or philanthropy or contributing gifts from corporate profits, it is certainly not all about charity.​[59]​ It is perhaps necessary to clarify that the position of corporate gift and charity had since been settled in judicial cases and eventually clarified in company legislations. A business is usually permitted to be engaged in charity and philanthropy only if same is benefiting the company in the long run and towards promoting the interests and success of the shareholders as a whole.​[60]​ Otherwise, corporate law abhors corporate gifting which is taken as undue depletion of capital and monies which will be otherwise available as profits for shareholders. Further, by virtue of section 38 of CAMA, all companies are said to have the powers of a natural person of full capacity including powers to make donations. It is logical to therefore conclude that, having the powers of a natural person portends that any incorporated business will therefore be able to engage in corporate gifting provided no contrary provisions exist in its memorandum and articles of association. Further, sub-section (2) only contains a prohibition of corporate gifts to political parties or to fund political associations or towards any other political purposes. Again, this can only mean that if such corporate donation is not towards any political ends or purposes and provided not otherwise prohibited by the company’s constitution (memorandum and articles of association), such corporate gifts will be intra vires, lawful and legitimate.​[61]​
However, although it will be lawful for corporate managers to engage in such corporate gifting from corporate funds, but where such is done randomly purely in the name of corporate charity, same will constitute undue depletion of capital which would otherwise have been available to shareholders as profits.​[62]​
Again, CAMA appears not to provide sufficiently conducive ideological support for effective CSR practices in Nigeria. CAMA adopts the traditional shareholder primacy model of corporate governance whereby corporate responsibility towards stakeholder group such as the employees, creditors, local communities, suppliers is afforded very limited chance.​[63]​ Further, the combined effects of the provisions of section 279(4) and (9) of CAMA also buttress the assertion of very limited support for CSR in Nigeria especially in terms of employee rights. Sub-section 4 appears to enjoin corporate managers to consider, have regard for and balance employee related issues and interests in making corporate decisions. However, sub-section 9 makes it abundantly clear that while these employees may believe that their interests are being taken into account in the promotion of the success of the company, they should not however attempt enforcing this right because they will fail since only the company (that is the shareholders as a whole) can sue if this right is violated or perceived to have been violated by corporate managers. This statutory provision is not strange at all as it is only a confirmation of section 299 of CAMA and codification of the long standing common law principle established in the case of Foss vs. Harbottle.​[64]​ 
What’s more, in terms of corporate statement reporting and disclosures, CAMA strictly focuses on the shareholder-centric model with no provisions for consideration of important stakeholder interests (such as local communities or suppliers) nor any provisions for corporate disclosures/reports on non-financial (social and environmental) matters.​[65]​   Everything towards accountability, transparency and corporate responsibility under CAMA has been geared towards shareholder protection with little or no protection afforded other constituents such the local community, suppliers, employees, contractors, the government, the environments and other relevant stakeholders.  It is interesting to note that both CAMA and the UK 2006 Companies Act share the similarity of not providing sufficiently conducive corporate law ideological model for effective CSR. Just like in Nigeria, the UK corporate governance system styled as ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’​[66]​ model - where extraneous competing interests of certain stakeholders are supposedly balanced but for the long term benefits of the shareholders​[67]​ - has its ideological foundation deeply rooted in the shareholder primacy model. To start with, corporate managers are statutorily required to ‘… promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole …’​[68]​ By way of other examples, shareholders still retain the ultimate control of the corporate managers​[69]​, the business owners have several participatory rights in corporate governance,​[70]​ the investors are specifically promised returns and benefits from the company’s profits​[71]​, the stockholders who may find themselves in minority are also assured of some protection​[72]​, the legislative and regulatory framework for mergers and takeovers of companies  still largely prioritizes shareholders’ interests as opposed to other stakeholders such as employees.​[73]​
Notwithstanding the above similarities, the UK CSR regulatory regime is still markedly different largely due to her membership of the EU where companies are encouraged to disclose and report on non-financial matters by virtue of the Accounts Modernisation Directive.​[74]​ UK companies by virtue of section 417 (5) of the 2006 UK Companies Act which implemented the EU Directive are required to disclose and report on non-financial matters. There are no such statutory requirements for annual reports on CSR non-financial matters like the environment, social and employee issues under CAMA. It is interesting to add that even the Corporate Responsibility Part VIII of the Nigerian 2007 Investment and Securities Act (ISA) which established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and regulating the activities of public liability and quoted companies in Nigeria fails to also provide for corporate reporting on non-financial matters.​[75]​ 

3.3	Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act 2007 – Publish What They Pay
The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) was inaugurated in February 2004 by former President Olusegun Obasanjo when he set up the National Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG) under the leadership of Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili.​[76]​ The NSWG oversees the activities of NEITI and has representatives from the government, extractive companies and civil society.  In order to give legal backing to the work of NEITI, a bill was introduced to the National Assembly in December 2004. The NEITI Bill was eventually passed and harmonized by the two chambers of the National Assembly and subsequently signed into law by former President Obasanjo on the eve of the last day of his administration, May 28, 2007.​[77]​ With this, Nigeria became the first EITI​[78]​-implementing country with a statutory backing for its operations.​[79]​
NEITI introduced the framework for transparency and accountability in the reporting and disclosure by all extractive companies of revenue due to or paid to the Federal Government of Nigeria​[80]​ and its governing body (NSWG) was to ensure compliance with due process, monitor and ensure accountability, eliminate corrupt practices, and ensure conformity with the global principles of EITI’​[81]​. NEITI’s cardinal functionality is complementary of the requirements to prepare and report on financial matters under CAMA. It is to ensure the transparency through publication of company accounts and through regular audits and tax returns on payments. NEITI commissioned the first comprehensive audit of Nigeria’s petroleum industry for the period 1999 to 2004 and has been working with various stakeholders to build national consensus on the need for extractive revenue transparency in Nigeria.​[82]​
The NSWG as the governing body of NEITI ensures that requisite framework through which NEITI’s mandate can be achieved is developed.​[83]​ The president of Nigeria has the powers to appoint not more than 14 persons as representatives of relevant stakeholder groups (labour groups, civil society, and extractive industries experts) into the NSWG.​[84]​ Despite all optimism, the NEITI regime has, however, not lived up to expectations in affording effective regulatory or enforcement framework for corporate accountability and responsibility. This is due to many reasons, a few of which are mentioned below.
First, the absolute power of the Nigerian President to appoint into NSWG for policy direction without any recourse to the National Assembly has been criticised as such is said to undermine the independence of NEITI and disrupts its integrity as a genuine stakeholder engagement platform.​[85]​ The appointment framework is also criticised as faulty as it gives rise to political cronies and sometimes clueless individuals into such sensitive positions.​[86]​
Secondly, NEITI appears to merely have powers to monitor payments to the government from the companies and publicise defaults without more. It is generally lamented that it has to rely on other government agencies to enforce any defaults or violations of its mandate.​[87]​ Against the background of the above statements, some scholars say NEITI is increasingly becoming toothless and institutionally moribund​[88]​  and that the NEITI Act only succeeded in transforming NEITI into a barking dog or a toothless bulldog that cannot bite.​[89]​
Further, there are other inherent clogs in the wheel of success within the NEITI Act itself as contained in sections 3 (d), (e) and 14 (1) of the NEITI Act. These provisions show that NEITI is inherently and fundamentally hindered in its transparency, accountability and responsibility mandate as it cannot utilize or otherwise  publish reports considered prejudicial to a company’s contractual obligations or proprietary interests (as there is no clear definition of what is prejudicial or highlighting its indicia). These provisions would appear to have precluded any hope of successful realisation of NEITI’s mandate from the onset. In the author’s thinking, this development is highly despicable and probably bordering on legislative rascality that intentions of private parties to contracts in the extractive industry – however crooked or dodgy such intentions might be – should be made to override the national interest (captured in the legislation).  One wonders if this can be attributed to the fact that NEITI was not assented to until the very last day of the former President Obasanjo’s administration. 
In summation, there is no gainsaying that the legal transplantation​[90]​ of the EITI Standards into the 2007 NEITI Act is fundamentally faulty. It appears that the drafters of the NEITI had very little consideration for the existing legal, institutional, and socio-economic realities of the recipient Nigerian system in the process of adapting the EITI principles. In my view, the NEITI Act attempts to put a square peg in a round whole. The majority of jurisdictions where transparency and accountability standards or requirements are intended such as the EITI principles; such jurisdictions ensure that the adopted framework fits into the general corporate law model of such countries. To this end for instance, the US adopts hard law mandatory regulations on any of its critical economic issues such as accountability and as such passed laws like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),​[91]​ prohibiting, amongst others, payment of bribes to foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business and it applies to prohibited conduct anywhere in the world and extends to publicly traded companies and their officers, directors, employees, stockholders, and agents.​[92]​ 
Further, the UK’s response is also coherent with its general corporate law model. That is, its CSR regulatory and enforcement regime is dependent on disclosure regime and social reporting on non-financial matters as contained in section 417 (5) of the 2006 English Companies Act and in line with the EU 2003 Accounts Modernisation Directive​[93]​  and the Directive 2014/95/EU​[94]​ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22nd October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups. Therefore, there is coherence in the legal instruments through which the UK authorities and agencies facilitate, endorse and encourage effective CSR practices. The relevant question is, what is the corporate law model on which the NEITI is premised in corporate Nigeria? Even the CAMA and the ISA do not support or contain provisions to facilitate CSR non-financial matter disclosure to stakeholders on which principle, inter alia, the EITI is premised.​[95]​  
Consequently, as a result of the sensitivity of NEITI’s mandate to a prosperous, accountable and responsible business community in the Nigerian oil, gas, extractive (and by extension, entire corporate Nigeria) industries, proper legal transplantation should be implemented to adapt the EITI Standards together with any other relevant and complementary international best standards and principles such as the Transparency International Promoting Revenue Transparency Project (PRT),​[96]​ United Nations Global Compact,​[97]​ and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework ​[98]​ to corporate Nigeria. Aside legislative efforts to solve the above noted inherent problems in the NEITI Act, the provisions of CAMA will also require amendment for coherence and in order to facilitate the mandate of NEITI.

3.4	Petroleum Industry Bill 2012
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) has been touted as the Nigerian oil gas industry messiah legislation and is much awaited by all stakeholders to solve the myriad of problems and challenges in the oil and gas Industry. PIB proposes to carry out an overarching regulatory and enforcement reform in the Nigerian upstream, midstream, downstream and natural gas industries. Such reforms include the unbundling of the national oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in order to make it more effective, efficient, transparent, accountable and responsible.  PIB has 362 sections, of 223 pages and supported by 5 schedules. While there are so many versions​[99]​ of PIB and several provisions therein are controversial, this portion of the article appraises its provisions relating to sustainability, accountability, transparency and other CSR related regulatory framework. For the purpose of this article, the version available on the Nigeria-Law website​[100]​ is adopted. In this regard, the following sections 4, 116, 190, and 290 will be examined.
Section 4 provides:
In achieving their functions and objectives under this Act, the institutions and the companies established in pursuance of this Act shall be bound by the principles of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act LFN 2007(sic).

 Section 190 (6) provides: 
All bids received based on the bid parameters established in subsection (2) of this section shall be handled in accordance with the published guidelines and monitored by the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI)

The above provisions demonstrate that the PIB relies on the accountability, transparency and corporate responsibility regime established under the NEITI Act of 2007. This development of ensuring full compliance with the NEITI Act, 2007 by all the institutions is confirmed by the 2009 NNPC’s PIB Inter-Agency Project Team Report.​[101]​  If this is the definition of transparency and accountability by the PIB, then all the criticisms noted under the discussions of NEITI are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the PIB. Further, section 116 of the PIB provides for the establishment a fund to be known as the Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHC Fund). PIB provides that each upstream petroleum company shall remit to the PHC Fund on a monthly basis 10% of its net profit which shall be utilised for the development of the economic and social infrastructure of the communities within the petroleum producing communities.​[102]​ This provision is interesting because it appears to adopt the same CSR conception as did the aborted 2007 CSR Bill demanding contribution of a percentage of corporate revenue to a fund.​[103]​  As a result of its noted qualification, though this extra corporate taxation may not really receive criticisms unlike the 2007 CSR Bill, it is however submitted that the capacity of effective channelling of such fund to local/host community developmental project is suspect.  In the author’s view, the fact that the PIB cannot define how the PHC Fund shall be effectively administered, managed and by what agency to achieve its objectives provides a recipe for further corrupt practices in the oil and gas operations and further impoverishment​[104]​ of the same host communities intended to be salvaged. This is because it gives oil and gas companies the impression of responsible and accountable corporate behaviour once the remittance to the fund has been done without any corresponding monitoring efforts to minimise any other negative socio-economic and environmental impacts of business operations. 
Based on the above analysis, it is obvious that the relevant accountability and corporate responsibility provisions in the PIB actually constitute a disservice to effective CSR regulatory and enforcement framework. Therefore, the author submits that further consultations and stakeholder engagement must be done by the government before passing the PIB.  Such engagement will afford proper amendments and redrafts of the relevant sustainability and CSR provisions in the PIB.

3.5	CSR AND CODES OF CONDUCT IN NIGERIA
The bulk of CSR and sustainability practices in Nigeria are at the moment largely regulated by voluntary,​[105]​ self-regulatory, soft law initiatives in the form of codes of corporate governance in different sectors and industries. There are about five of such self-regulatory and soft law initiatives.​[106]​ 
It is quite commendable that notable Nigerian government institutions and regulatory agencies make attempts to facilitate and encourage corporate accountability, transparency and responsibility through the incorporation of sustainability provisions and transparency sections in their regulatory framework. An examination of principles 2.2, 2.8.1, 28.3 and 34.1 of the 2011 SEC code and principles 6.6, 10.1 and 12.0 of the 2014 NCC code shows that accountability to both shareholders and stakeholder groups is encouraged and corporate transparency and responsibility towards sustainable development is enjoined in corporate Nigeria.  
Although these, on the surface, appear commendable, however the relevant question is, how effective can they be? The provisions, most of the time, use the word ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’ demonstrating their lack of hard law bite. Moreover, in situations where more binding expressions such as ‘shall’ is used, yet, the general connotation of such provisions does not demonstrate robust corporate responsibility regulation or effective enforcement mechanisms towards achieving responsible corporate behaviour.​[107]​   In the wake of the soft law approach​[108]​ of these codes, how efficient can these vague CSR regulatory provisions be in the effective enforcement of responsible and accountable corporate behaviour in Nigeria? It has been established that soft law regimes are generally only useful against law-abiding corporate entities and will become grossly inadequate and inefficient against rogue corporate entities in the society who are simply within the business community to maximise profits at all costs.​[109]​
Secondly, these codes are also inefficient in ensuring accountability and corporate responsibility having had a faulty premise. It is arguable that they will be unenforceable against companies because such social reporting or stakeholder provisions therein are ultra vires the powers of the agencies prescribing them. For instance, throughout the length and breadth of the principal corporate and securities law legislations in Nigeria (CAMA and ISA), there is no positive legal obligation on any company or their directors ‘to balance the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders’ as required by Principle 10 of the NCC Code. Further, nothing in these primary legislations also requires corporate social reporting on non-financial matters as stated by Principle 12 of the NCC Code. In addition, there is nothing in these primary legislations or in the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act Cap B3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 requiring financial institutions in Nigeria to ‘demonstrate good sense of corporate social responsibility to their stakeholders’ as provided under Principle 4.1.3 of the CBN Code. Therefore, regardless of any provisions in the codes attempting to ensure compliance with such requirements, they may simply just be unenforceable as the agencies prescribing might after all have acted ultra vires.​[110]​  

3.6	THE PROPOSED NATIONAL CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 




4.	AN AGENDA FOR REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT REFORMS 
The analysis in this demonstrates that CSR together with its values of corporate transparency, accountability and responsibility for sustainability issues and effective disclosure on non-financial matters in corporate Nigeria is almost non-existence at the level of primary hard law legislations (CAMA, ISA, NEITI et cetera) and not only grossly inadequate but also having faulty legal premise at the level of soft law subsidiary legislations (SEC Code of Corporate Governance, NCC Code et cetera.) 
This non-existent and/or grossly inadequate CSR framework is usually taken advantage of by industrialized societies and their MNEs who export potentially liability-attractive activities from their societies to the less developed systems which are safe havens for substandard and irresponsible corporate behaviour.​[113]​ Further, making matters worse, where these weak systems make efforts to strengthen their enforcement regime and hold companies (especially the high-profile MNEs) legally accountable and responsible, the companies either bargain away effective accountability and efficient corporate responsibility regimes before investing in such a country or if after investment and seeing that the national government has awaken to its responsibilities, they just altogether liquidate and practically move their investment to another weaker jurisdiction.​[114]​ (The latter development is what is called regulatory jurisdictional arbitrage)   
Consequently, from this rather delicate situation, it is the author’s submission that there are two alternatives for corporate Nigeria in ensuring effective corporate accountability responsibility. The first option is that Nigeria may work towards the harmonization of the different and incoherent hard and soft law regulatory and enforcement frameworks visible within its primary and secondary legislation to secure better CSR disclosure and accountability framework as already prevailing in the industrialized systems such as in the UK. This option will not be drastic and is unlikely to cause regulatory jurisdictional arbitrage in corporate Nigeria. Alternatively, against the backdrop of the perception that soft law voluntary regulatory regimes are generally inadequate and inefficient on sensitive matters, Nigeria, just like the US, may opt for a hard law mandatory approach within a framework suggested later in this article. These two options are explained further in turn.

4.1	Harmonization of Soft Law Self-Regulatory Shareholder Primacy Framework 
This first recommendation leverages the Enlightened Shareholder Value which is an improved version of the shareholder primacy model and as developed in the UK. ​[115]​ It encourages corporate managers and directors to manage the companies in the interests of shareholders as whole but with adequate regard to stakeholder interests.  CAMA already contains provisions towards shareholder primacy model but lags behind on sustainability, accountability and responsibility matters especially in respect of stakeholder interests such as the interests of employees and local communities. Therefore, in order to adopt this approach, the first step to be taken will be to amend relevant provisions of CAMA to expand its requirements on financial statements and annual report to include corporate social reporting and disclosures beyond strict financial matters which are presently only beneficial to shareholders. This will also not be strange at all and will be modeled after section 417 of the 2006 UK English Companies Act. It may also be necessary to amend the relevant reporting/disclosure provisions in the ISA to also include non-financial reporting on issues of the environment, employees, social matters et cetera.
Further, the provisions of NEITI will also require amendments to secure the independence and integrity of the NSWG such that NEITI’s mandate of ensuring transparency, monitoring  accountability, eliminating corrupt practices, and ensuring conformity with the global standards of the EITI is achieved. The drafters to be involved in the amendments must demonstrate proper appreciation of the issues and ensure that proper legal transplantation of other relevant international best standards such as the UNGC, the UNGP, PRT, and OECD MNE Guidelines is done. Further, the provisions of sections 3 and 14 of the NEITI Act undermining the ability of NEITI to use or publish audited reports considered prejudicial to some signed contracts of the extractive industries companies or the government must be revisited. If such sections cannot be deleted from the NEITI Act, then, a clause must be introduced clearly stating what may be considered prejudicial, which in any event, should not override the national interests of Nigeria as a sovereign. 
Once the first and second issues above are addressed, the risk of the ultra vires argument and leading to non-compliance with the disclosure on non-financial and sustainability issues regime in the codes of conducts or in the proposed National Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) of the FRC would have also been addressed.

4.2	Mandating Hard Law Stakeholder Framework
The alternative approach is to reject the strict shareholder primacy model on which the first option is based. It is based on a modern corporate law model which places positive duty on the companies not just to have regard to stakeholder interests but to demonstrate proper consideration and balancing of both shareholder and stakeholder interests in reaching corporate decisions. The ambits of this corporate law model were espoused by the author elsewhere.​[116]​ Therefore, it is recommended that an effective CSR regulatory regime will be better fostered, enhanced and implemented under this model which presumes corporate social irresponsibility whenever a complaint is raised by a stakeholder and places positive legal duty on the company to demonstrate transparency, accountability and responsibility in its operations. This onus of demonstrating transparency, accountability, responsibility should be reasonably discharged by showing, on a scale of probability, that such complained corporate behaviour, decision, action or inaction has been taken or occurred having balanced all stakeholder interests and in the best interest of the company (which should not just be the myopic interests of only members (shareholders) of the company as a whole​[117]​, but the interests of all relevant stakeholder such as the employees, the local community, the creditors, the customers, the environment, the government and including the shareholders).​[118]​ A company against which a complaint has been lodged may so demonstrate responsibility and accountability in its operations by way of an internalised company procedure or framework which complies with international best practices and business guidelines contained in any NEITI guidelines, UNGC, UNGP, OECD Guidelines or other similar self-regulatory initiatives; or by membership of an international certification or global reporting scheme for responsible business conduct such as the Global Reporting Initiative and others; or verifiable stakeholder engagement practices demonstrating constant consideration and balancing of stakeholder and shareholder rights et cetera. 
It is instructive to note that emphasis is placed on the word ‘may’ used in the last paragraph. In other words, demonstrated compliance with international best practices, business guidelines or international certification schemes or stakeholder engagement programmes should only be rebuttable presumptions and in no way conclusive proof or evidence that such a company acted or behaved responsibly in any particular circumstance. The conclusiveness of such actions will have to be determined, on a scale of probabilities, by judicial authorities (regular courts) acting both judicious and judicially on a case-by-case basis.
Rather than any imposition of another corporate tax under the guise of corporate accountability and CSR regulations (as did the aborted 2007 Nigerian CSR Bill) or introduction of some highly prescriptive and intrusive external hard law initiatives which may scare off investment opportunities​[119]​, this proposed framework enjoins individual companies, however its size​[120]​, to develop and implement its own sustainability, accountability and responsible corporate practice framework and ensure that negative human, social, economic, or environmental impacts of its operations are duly addressed and curtailed.
In summation, it is submitted that, unlike popular perception, the problem with corporate Nigeria has not been lack of enforcement per se.​[121]​ The argument attributes this to the double standards exhibited by many companies in different countries of their operation.​[122]​ The author rather submits that the challenge is not really lack of enforcement, per se but rather a case of wide-spread extant faulty legislations or proposed laws based on improperly transplanted corporate law models into the Nigerian system. A very good case in point was demonstrated in the discussions under NEITI and the proposed PIB.
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